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UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE IN INDIANA:
A REVIEW AND PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
Motor vehicle accidents pose one of the most formidable
threats to the health and economic security of the American people.'
The majority of motorists in the United States shift at least a por-
tion of this risk through the acquisition of automobile liability in-
surance.2 There are, however, individuals who neither purchase in-
surance nor possess sufficient funds to compensate innocent victims
for personal injuries sustained as a result of the negligent operation
of a motor vehicle.3
In Indiana, approximately one out of every twenty licensed
drivers is involved in a motor vehicle accident annually.' When that
accident takes place, the chances are one in ten that the driver is
struck by, or is himself, an uninsured motorist or a hit-and-run
driver.' A conservative projection for 1979 indicates that financially
1. In 1977 motor vehicle accidents were the sixth leading cause of death in
/ United States, accounting for 47,671 fatalities. It is estimated that the annual
firect economic loss resulting from motor vehicle accidents is $43 billion. NATIONAL
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY COMMISSION, HIGHWAY SAFETY. 1977: A REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 3 (1978).
2. It is estimated that nationwide approximately eighty percent of all
motorists possess some form of automobile liability insurance. UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY. DRIVER
BEHAVIOR AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 207 (1970).
3. Estimates of the number of uninsured motorists vary from state to state.
For example, in Maryland, New York, and North Carolina, states with compulsory in-
surance laws, less than ten percent of all motorists are not insured. However, at the
extreme, one-third of all vehicles in Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Mississippi are
uninsured. In the remaining states the percentage of uninsured motorists is between
fifteen and twenty-five percent. BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION.
(UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STUDY), REPORT OF THE DIVISION OF
INDUSTRY ANALYSIS 28-29 (1970).
4. According to statistics maintained by the Indiana Bureau of Motor
Vehicles, there were 4,276,266 licensed drivers in Indiana in 1977 and 213,739 reported
accidents involving physical damage in excess of $200. Letter from David R. Nelson,
Project Coordinator, Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles, to writer (September 26, 1978).
. The exact number of uninsured motorists in Indiana is impossible to
determine from the statistical data maintained by the Bureau of Motor Vehicles.
However, based upon the study of the Department of Transporation, note 3 supra, a
conservative estimate of ten percent would not be unreasonable. Indeed, a rate of fif-
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irresponsible motorists in Indiana will in some manner be involved
in over 20,000 accidents, resulting in some 120 deaths and 6,500 in-
juries.'
A portion of the great loss occasioned by uninsured motorists
is absorbed each year by automobile insurance companies who must
meet the provisions and requirements of the Indiana Uninsured
Motorists Act.' The Indiana statute requires every insurer authorized
to underwrite automobile liability insurance in the state to offer
uninsured motorist8 coverage. This coverage is issued as a part of
the insured's automobile policy and permits the insured, when an in-
nocent victim of an accident caused by an uninsured motorist, to
seek compensation from his own company for personal injuries.
Unless this coverage is rejected in writing by the insured, it
becomes part of every automobile insurance policy issued in
Indiana.'
The Indiana legislature, like the legislative bodies of thirty-five
teen to twenty percent may be more accurate. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION STUDY, DRIVER BEHAVIOR
AND ACCIDENT INVOLVEMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR TORT LIABILITY 204-05 (1970).
6. These estimates were obtained by dividing the total number of accidents,
deaths, and injuries occurring in Indiana in 1977 by ten.
7. The Indiana Uninsured Motorists Act states:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy or insurance insur-
ing against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury
or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or prin-
cipally garaged in this state, unless coverage is provided therein or sup-
plemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death as set forth in Acts
1947, chapter 159, sec. 14 [9-2-1-15], as amended heretofore and hereafter,
under policy provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance, for
the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting
therefrom.
Provided, That the named insured shall have the right to reject
such coverage (in writing) and Provided further, That unless the named
insured thereafter requests such coverage, in writing, such coverage need
not be provided in or supplemental to a renewal policy where the named
insured has rejected the coverage in connection with a policy previously
issued to him by the same insurer.
IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976).
8. Hereinafter cited as UM.
9. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supra.
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other states," enacted a very general statute." The language of the
act is not explicit and it contains no definitions. There are, however,
three limitations which the statute places on coverage available
from the insurance carriers. First, the insured must be "legally en-
titled" to recover from the owner or operator of the uninsured vehi-
cle involved in the accident. 2 Second, the UM coverage extends only
to damages resulting from bodily injury, sickness, disease, or
death; 8 the coverage does not pay for property damage caused by
the negligence of the uninsured motorist.1' Finally, the coverage
need only be offered in limits prescribed by the Indiana Safety-
Responsibility Act." This means that in most instances" the insured
is protected for losses up to $15,000 per person and $30,000 per
occurrence.
Taking advantage of the very general statutory language, in-
surance policy draftsmen have developed a number of provisions
that restrict, exclude, or limit UM coverage, in order to reduce the
possibility of fraudulent claims and the insurer's exposure to liability
risks. Courts have traditionally looked with disfavor upon these at-
tempts to narrow the scope of UM protection. As a result, many
limitations have been judicially voided on the basis that they place
an unfair burden on the insured or that they conflict with the
remedial nature of the UM statutes.' In spite of the years of con-
10. See A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE. 129-30 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WIDISS]. For a complete list of citations to the UM statutes of all
fifty states, see Comment, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 222, 222-23 n.4 (1977).
11. See note 7 supra.
12. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supr.
13. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supra.
14. Only nine states require UM coverage to be extended to include losses for
both bodily injury and property damage. See DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 3902 (1974); GA. CODE
ANN. § 56-407.1(a) (Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 64-24-105 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
20-279.21(b)(3) (1978); S.C. CODE § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1975); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1148
(Supp. 1978); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon Supp. 1978); VA. CODE §
38.1-381(b) (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31(b) (1975).
15. IND. CODE § 9-2-1-1 et seq. (1976). The Indiana Safety-Responsibility Act
establishes a mechanism for proving financial responsibility in the event of a motor
vehicle accident. Failure to prove the ability to respond in damages for liability,
through either personal financial resources or an automobile liability insurance policy,
can result in suspension or revocation of the driver's license.
16. The Indiana Safety-Responsibility Act, IND. CODE § 9-2-1-15 (1976),
prescribes minimum limits of $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. As a result,
most insurance policies will provide benefits only in these amounts unless otherwise
specifically requested by the insured.
17. The courts of many states, including Indiana, have been consistently han-
dicapped in their quest to interpret the legislative intendment of the UM statutes.
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troversy and the flood of litigation that various restrictive clauses
have spawned, state legislatures have for the most part taken no
steps to modify or clarify the statutes.18 At the same time, the state
insurance departments, statutorily charged with the responsibility
of approving insurance policy forms and coverages, have
demonstrated a pronounced reluctance to undertake any reform.19
The situation in Indiana is particularly bleak. The Indiana
legislature has not addressed itself to the UM statute since 1 9 6 9 .
Further, while the Indiana statute has been judicially interpreted on
many occasions, no case has ever reached the Indiana Supreme
Court.2 Perhaps most disturbing is the fact that the Indiana Depart-
ment of Insurance has taken no action, despite its authority to do
This is largely due to the paucity of information and documentation revealing the
history and purpose of such statutes. As a result, courts have been compelled to resort
to their own perception of statutory purpose and have reached their decisions accord-
ingly. A good example of such judicial pronouncements is contained in Bocek v. Inter-
Insurance Exchange, - Ind. App. -, 369 N.E.2d 1093 (1977): "[I]t must be
remembered that the purpose behind uninsured motorist coverage and the statutes
which require the same is to afford the same protection to a person injured by the
uninsured motorist as he would have enjoyed if the offending motorist had himself car-
ried liability insurance." Id. at 1097.
18. There are, of course, exceptions to this general statement. The UM
statutes of California, CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1978), and Georgia, GA.
CODE ANN. § 56-407.1 (Supp. 1978), are good examples of statutes that have been con-
tinually scrutinized by their respective legislatures. The California act, adopted in
1961, has undergone no fewer than eleven amendments in order to change or clarify its
already explicit and detailed language. Similarly, the Georgia statute has been amended
nine times in its fifteen year history.
.19. Only the Wyoming Department of Insurance has promulgated a comp-
rehensive series of regulations governing UM coverages circulated in that state.
WYOMING INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RULES AND REGULATIONS. REGULATION GOVERNING
UNINSURED MOTORISTS ENDORSEMENTS. Ch. XXIII (1975). See Smith, The Wyoming
Uninsured Motorist Act. A Regulatory Reconciliation of Mandated Coverages with
the Standard Uninsured Motorist Endorsement, 11 LAND AND WATER L. REV. 213
(1976).
20. In 1969 the Indiana Uninsured Motorists Act was amended by adding pro-
visions regarding "insurers insolvency protection" and "subrogation rights" of the in-
surer. No further action has since taken place.
21. The following is a complete list of all cases interpreting uninsured
motorists coverage in Indiana: Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565
(7th Cir. 1978) ("good faith" requirement in UM settlements); Miller v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indemnity Co., 506 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1974) (intra-policy stacking of UM
coverages); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Capps, 506 F.2d 16 (7th Cir. 1974) (intra-policy
stacking of UM coverages); Dunn v. Meridian Mutual Ins. Co., Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D.
Ind. November 16, 1972) (intra-policy stacking of UM coverages); Vantine v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 335 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ind. 1971) (owned but uninsured
clause); Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.
Ind. 1970) (medical payments set-off clause and excess-escape clause); Rozina v. United
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SO.2 This combination of factors results in there being no real
definitive statement of policy on UM coverage in Indiana. Mean-
while, insurance policies which contain UM exclusions and limita-
tions that have otherwise been judicially voided continue to be sold
and circulated within the state. This situation fosters confusion and
controversy between insurance companies and their policyholders.
This note will explain the operative effects of six major policy
restrictions most often employed by insurers to limit their liability
exposure under the UM coverage. Judicial treatment of these limita-
tions and exclusions, with a special emphasis on the Indiana deci-
sions, will also be scrutinized. It will be seen that while limitations
on "owned but uninsured"2 vehicles and "other insurance""U have in
most instances been judicially voided, these clauses indeed serve
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Civil No. 69 H 257 (N.D. Ind. September 15, 1970)
(intra-policy stacking of UM coverages); Capps v. Klebs, - Ind. App. -, 382
N.E.2d 947 (1978) (subrogation clause); United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Runnels, __ Ind. App. -, 382 N.E.2d 1015 (1978) (pro-rata clause); United Farm
Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, - Ind. App. - , 382 N.E.2d 1018 (1978) (consent
to sue clause); Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Exchange, __ Ind. App. -, 369 N.E.2d
1093 (1977) (arbitration clause and rejection of coverage); Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v.
Lamb, - Ind. App. -, 361 N.E.2d 174 (1977) (physical contact requirement);
United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hanley, - Ind. App. - , 360 N.E.2d 247
(1977) (household exclusion); Vernon Fire & Casualty Co. v. American Underwriters,
Inc., __ Ind. App. - 356 N.E.2d 693 (1976) (persons insured); Taylor v. American
Underwriters, Inc., n__ d. App. _, 352 N.E.2d 86 (1976) (hit-and-run coverage);
Vernon Fire & Casualty Co. v. Matney, - Ind. App. - , 351 N.E.2d 60 (1976) (in-
tervention by insurer); Leist v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 160 Ind. App. 322, 311 N.E.2d
828 (1974) (workmen's compensation set-off clause); Jeffries v. Stewart, 159 Ind. App.
701, 309 N.E.2d 448 (1974) (intra-policy stacking of UM coverages); State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 156 Ind. App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626 (1973) (persons in-
sured); Blankenbaker v. Great Central Ins. Co., 151 Ind. App. 693, 281 N.E.2d 496
(1972) (physical contact requirement); American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 151 Ind.
App. 99, 278 N.E.2d 295 (1972) (subrogation clause); Cannon v. American Underwriters,
Inc., 150 Ind. App. 21, 275 N.E.2d 567 (1971) (persons insured); Ely v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 148 Ind. App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (1971) (physical contact
requirement); Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co., 148 Ind. App. 548, 267 N.E.2d 859 (1971)
(excess-escape clause); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Noble, 148 Ind. App. 297, 265 N.E.2d 419
(1970) (arbitration clause and consent to sue clause); Buehrer v. Indiana Ins. Co., 146
Ind. App. 438, 256 N.E.2d 414 (1970) (physical contact requirement); Lewis v. American
Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977) (persons insured).
22. The Indiana Administrative Procedures Act, IND. CODE §§ 4-22-2-1-11
(1976), as well as the Indiana Insurance Law, IND. CODE § 27-1-1-1 et seq. (1976), em-
power the Indiana Department of Insurance to supervise and regulate all insurance
companies operating within the state and to promulgate rules and regulations for the
protection and benefit of the policy-holders of the state.
23. See notes 72 through 94 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 95 through 127 infra and accompanying text.
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legitimate purposes and should be enforced. On the other hand,
restrictions on the meaning of "insured" 5 and on the recovery of
medical payments2 and workmen's compensation' benefits lack
merit and have been properly invalidated by the courts. Still other
provisions, specifically the physical contact28  and notice' re-
quirements of the hit-and-run coverage, should be modified to better
serve the interests of both the insured and the insurance companies.
Finally, in an appendix following the text, this note will set out pro-
posed regulations designed for adoption by the Indiana Department
of Insurance.
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROVISIONS
The Standard Form Uninsured Motorist Endorsement' con-
tains several limitations designed to reduce or eliminate entirely the
insurer's liability exposure. The insurance company may insulate
25. See notes 36 through 71 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 128 through 149 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 150 through 164 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 167 through 199 infra and accompanying text.
29. See notes 200 through 215 infra and accompanying text. It must be noted
at the outset that the hit-and-run coverage provision is not always a statutorily man-
dated protection afforded victims of uninsured motorists. The statutes of twenty-five
states have provisions for either "unknown" or "hit-and-run" motorists. See CAL. INS.
CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 18, § 3902 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §
56-407.1 (Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IOWA
CODE § 516A.1 (Supp. 1978-79); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24A, § 2902 (Supp. 1978-79); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113L (West 1977); MINN. STAT. § 65B.49(4) (Supp. 1979);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-11-101-103 (Supp. 1978); NEB. REV. STAT. § 60-509.01 (1974); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:28-1.1 (Supp. 1978-79); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 64-24-105 (1972); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 617, 618 (McKinney 1966); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 36, § 3636 (West Supp. 1978-79); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 743:786-792 (1977-78); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2.1 (Supp. 1977); S.C. CODE § 46-750.31-34 (Supp. 1975); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 58-11-9 (1967); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1148 (Supp. 1978); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 41-12-21.1 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 941 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 38.1-381 (Supp.
1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (Supp. 1977); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1975). Of these
twenty-five statutes, only about one-third define the meaning of "unknown" or "hit-
and-run" motorist. In the vast majority of states, then, hit-and-run coverage is defined
solely by the terms of the insurance policy contract. Likewise, the coverage in most in-
stances is one that is extended voluntarily by the insurer. Because this coverage is
subject to several limitations which have been the subject of much judicial scrutiny
and revision, treatment of this policy provision is afforded in this note.
30. The Standard Form UM Endorsement is a complete policy developed by
the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the Mutual Insurance Rating
Bureau. Originally drafted in 1956, it has undergone several revisions before reaching
its present form. Because the Standard Form has been widely accepted and used by
the insurance industry, it will be referred to repeatedly in this note in order to
demonstrate the scope and form of the typical UM endorsement.
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itself from certain risks by narrowly defining the persons insured by
the policy"- or by excluding certain vehicles based upon ownership
or insurance status.2 Risk may be further reduced through the use
of "other insurance" clauses" and set-off provisions for benefits
derived from medical payments coverage' of the automobile policy
or from workmen's compensation laws." These five limitations on
UM coverage are discussed below.
Limitations on Persons Insured
Frequently UM endorsements limit the scope of the insurer's
risk by narrowly defining the persons insured under the policy. The
Standard Form UM Endorsement sets forth a broad definition of
"insured"'" and, as a result, has not been the target of judicial
scrutiny. Despite the wide use of the Standard Form, however, some
insurers have chosen to tailor their own definition of "insured" in
order to confer coverage upon fewer people. 7 These specially
designed provisions have been the objects of much litigation.
Insurers effect reduction of the meaning of "insured" by ex-
cluding certain persons based upon family status, age, or the use of
the vehicle involved. As a result, some policies do not cover children
or other relatives of the named insured and spouse, 8 or persons
31. See notes 36 through 71 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 72 through 94 infra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 95 through 127 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 128 through 149 infra and accompanying text.
35. See notes 150 through 164 infra and accompanying text.
36. The present Standard Form UM Endorsement sets out three groups of
persons who are insured under the terms of the policy. Specifically, the endorsement
provides:
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set
forth below:
(a) the named insured and any designated insured and, while residents
of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either;
(b) any person while occupying any insured highway vehicle, and
(c) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
because of bodily injury to which this insurance applies sustained
by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
1966 STANDARD FORM. PART II: PERSONS INSURED. For text of complete Standard Form
see WIDISS, supra, note 10 at App. A, 1 (1969).
37. See, e.g., Roach v. Central National Ins. Co., 60 Mich. App. 40, 230 N.W.2d
297 (1975); Chakalos v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 321, 267 A.2d 573 (1970); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 274 Ore. 145, 545 P.2d 113 (1976); Mur-
ray v. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 2 Wash. App. 985, 472 P.2d 611 (1970).
38. By way of illustration, consider this actual policy provision: "Persons In-
sured: The following are insured under the uninsured motorist coverage: The named
1979]
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under the age of twenty-five not named in the policy, 9 or the in-
sured while occupying another vehicle."0 As a general rule, courts in
many jurisdictions have rejected these limitations by employing
primarily three rationales."
Some courts have rendered the exclusionary clause inapplicable
by finding that an ambiguity exists in the policy terms." In one
case,'8 the automobile liability section of the policy contained a
definition of "insured" that was broader than the definition of "in-
sured" in the policy's UM endorsement. The court noted that the
policy was subject to differing constructions and, applying a fun-
insured and lawful spouse of such named insured if, and only if, such spouse is living
with the named insured at the time of the accident." This provision was the source of
controversy in Vernon Fire & Casualty Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., - Ind.
App. - , 356 N.E.2d 693 (1976), notes 65 and 67 infra.
39. A common form of this exclusion reads: "The coverages afforded by the
policy do not apply while the insured automobile is being driven by any person under
the age of twenty-five unless such person is named in the policy." The validity of this
provision was litigated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, v. Dairyland Ins. Co.,
274 Ore. 145, 545 P.2d 113 (1976).
40. These limitations may take form in any number of ways. Coverage may be
excluded for persons using the insured automobile with the permission of the insured.
See Roach v. Central National Ins. Co., 60 Mich. App. 40, 230 N.W.2d 297 (1975).
Coverage may also preclude recovery to an insured while a guest passenger in a non-
owned vehicle. See Cannon v. American Underwriters, Inc., 150 Ind. App. 21, 275
N.E.2d 567 (1971). Finally, as in Chakalos v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 321, 267 A.2d
573 (1970), the policy may exclude coverage for an insured while occupying or using a
vehicle other than a private passenger automobile,
41. See, e.g., Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton,
241 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Lopez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 250
Cal. App. 2d 210, 58 Cal. Rptr. 243 (1967); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Booker, 140 Ga. App. 3, 230 S.E.2d 70 (1976); Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
626 (Mo. App. 1963); Murray v. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 2 Wash. App. 985, 472 P.2d
611 (1970).
42. In Murray v. Western Pacific Ins. Co., 2 Wash. App. 985, 472 P.2d 611
(1970), the court held:
At the outset of this analysis we must remember the rule of construction
that 'the language of insurance policies is to be interpreted in accordance
with the way it would be understood by the average man, rather than in
a technical sense.' (cite omitted).
While we would agree that the youthful driver endorsement could
be read as defendant contends, we believe that it could also be read to
mean that coverage under the policy would be suspended only if the
automobile is being driven by a driver under the age of twenty-five who
is not a member of the family of the named insured.
Id at 614.
43. Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. App. 1963).
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damental rule of contract law," resolved the conflict in favor of the
insured and against the insurer who had drafted the policy provi-
sions."
Such policy provisions have also been voided by emphasizing
the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the insurance
contract. By demonstrating that the accident in issue took place in a
manner within the contemplation of the parties at the time the in-
surer accepted the risk, an injured party has been able to overcome
restrictive provisions of the policy and be deemed an insured."6 This
second rationale was effectively used to overcome a policy restric-
tion in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Booker. 7 In that case,
a garbage collector was struck and injured by an uninsured motorist
while standing more than thirty feet away from the insured vehicle.
The court held that the injured worker was an insured within the
meaning of the policy because the parties contemplated that the use
of the insured garbage truck entailed loading, unloading, and
workers walking down the road ahead of the vehicle."
The third rationale used by courts to circumvent restrictive
policy provisions holds that the provisions conflict with public policy
as embodied in the applicable UM statute." These courts reason that
the purpose of the UM statutes would be eroded if insurers were
permitted to dilute the scope of coverage by imposing restrictive
provisions. 0 Since the majority of statutes permit the insured to re-
44. Verba fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem. Words are to be taken most
strongly against him who uses them. See Tinn v. Hoffman & Co., 27 Law. T.R. [N.S.]
271 (1873).
45. 374 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Mo. App. 1963).
46. See, e.g., Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton,
241 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C. 1965).
47. 140 Ga. App. 3, 230 S.E.2d 70 (1976).
48. 1& at 73.
49. Lopez v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 Cal. App. 2d 210, 58
Cal. Rptr. 243 (1967); Kaufman v. Economy Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 940, 368 N.E.2d 271
(1977); Cadillac Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 144, 212 N.W.2d 816 (1973);
Chakalos v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 110 N.H. 321, 267 A.2d 573 (1970); Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 274 Ore. 145, 545 P.2d 113 (1976).
50. The language of the court in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Dairyland Ins. Co., 274 Ore. 145, 545 P.2d 113 (1976), typifies judicial sentiment:
It is our conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the uninsured
motorist coverage should be subject to qualification. . . .The language
purports to specifically exclude the insured from uninsured motorist
coverage by a provision that relates primarily to the liability coverage of
the policy. The restriction is inserted to exclude responsibility for loss
caused by a high risk class of drivers of the insured vehicle. The risk has
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ject UM coverage," insurance companies have responded that accep-
tance of a policy with restrictions constitutes a partial rejection of
the coverage. 2 In other words, by accepting the limiting policy form,
the insured not only agrees to the limitations contained therein, but
impliedly rejects coverage for those persons subject to the limita-
tions. This argument is tenuous at best; a person purchasing in-
surance cannot reject a coverage that was never offered to him. One
court has flatly rejected this form of argument, holding that "such a
piecemeal whittling away of liability is void as against public
policy."5
Underlying these three rationales seems to be a judicial policy
of extending coverage to those persons for whom the insurance pur-
chaser would have sought coverage had he been in the position to
specify coverage.' At the same time, however, the decisions of other
courts would justify an insurer's belief that such limitations on per-
sons insured may be upheld if they are stated unambiguously and if
little relation to the risk which is covered by uninsured motorist in-
surance because such coverage appertains to the risk created by the unin-
sured motorist. As a result, any such limitation or exclusion from unin-
sured motorist coverage would defeat on an arbitrary basis the legislative
aim of providing protection to those injured by the negligence of an unin-
sured motorist.
Id. at 115.
51. Only the statutes of eleven states mandate coverage and permit no option
on the part of the insured to reject coverage. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-175(c)
(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 755a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24A,
§ 2902 (Supp. 1978); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 113L (West 1977); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 268:15-a (1977); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 617, 618 (McKinney 1966); ORE. REv.
STAT. §§ 743:786-792 (1977-78); S.C. CODE § 46-750.31-34 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 941 (Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1978); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-31 (1975).
52. See, e.g., California Casualty & Indemnity Exchange v. Steven, 5 Cal.
App. 3d 304, 85 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1970); Southeast Title and Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 231 So.
2d 201 (Fla. 1970).
53. California Casualty & Indemnity Exchange v. Steven, 5 Cal. App. 3d 304,
85 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1970).
54. WIDISS, supra, note 10, at § 213 (1969). There are probably two main
reasons why the average person seeking to purchase insurance is not in the position to
specify coverage. First, most insurance policies are pre-printed form policies which
provide little or no option for customization to particular needs. In the majority of
cases, only the amounts of the liability limits are within the control of the consumer.
The person seeking insurance must either take the policy as offered or engage in ex-
tensive comparison shopping. If the consumer does choose the latter option, he is con-
fronted with a second problem. Policy language can be confusing to a non-expert in in-
surance and very often the purchaser only thinks he has obtained the coverage he
wants. Thus, an insured may first become aware of his actual policy coverages only
after a claim has been filed -after the damage has occurred and it is too late to do
anything about it.
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the insurance consumer has been fully apprised of the coverage he
is receiving. Indeed, some courts have recognized the parties'
freedom to contract for such limitations if both parties are fully
aware of the policy terms.5 In these cases, the perceived purpose of
the UM is balanced with the insured's right to purchase affordable
coverage."' Similarly, agreements to limit the scope of coverage may
be permitted so long as terms are used consistently throughout the
policy. 7 These decisions, then, focus on the rights of the parties to
contract freely so long as the insured has knowledge of the limita-
tions and the policy language is clear.
The Indiana courts have twice been confronted with cases in-
volving policy endorsements containing limitations on the persons
insured. In both instances the courts chose not to reject them on
the basis of some contract doctrine but rather found them to be in
derogation of the Indiana UM act." In Cannon v. American Under-
writers, Inc.,' the policy contained an endorsement that covered the
insured only while occupying a vehicle owned by him. This policy
restriction effectively barred recovery by the insured while driving
or riding in another person's vehicle."' The plaintiff sustained bodily
55. Southeast Title and Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 231 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1970);
Green v. Great American Ins. Co., 516 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
56. In Green v. Great American Ins. Co., 516 SW.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974), the court stated:
The plaintiff in this case was offered, and accepted, a contract furnishing
her uninsured motorist coverage except when her son was driving the
automobile. Why should that be contrary to public policy? If plaintiffs
contention is allowed to become law in Texas, insured motorists with sons
or daughters with bad driving records will be unable to secure uninsured
motorist coverage in any form except from the assigned pool at a much
greater cost. Public policy dictates the allowance of partial rejection of
such coverage in order to allow insureds in that situation to secure in-
surance they can afford ....
Id. at 740.
57. In Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wash. 2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976), the in-
sured sought to have the definitions of "automobile" and "insured" interpreted by the
court. In finding that the terms were consistently applied throughout the insurance
policy, the court held that it could not "rule out of the contract language which the
parties thereto have put into it, nor [could it] revise the contract under the theory of
construing it, nor [could it] impose obligations which never before existed." Id. at 11.
58. Vernon Fire & Casualty Co. v. American Underwriters, Inc., Ind.
App. -, 356 N.E.2d 693 (1976); Cannon v. American Underwriters, Inc., 150 Ind.
App. 21, 275 N.E.2d 567 (1971).
59. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supra.
60. 150 Ind. App. 21, 275 N.E.2d 567 (1971).
61. The policy issued by American Underwriters contained the following UM
exclusion: "This policy does not apply under the uninsured motorist coverage: unless
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injury while a guest passenger in an uninsured automobile. The in-
surer denied coverage under the UM provision, citing the policy ex-
clusion.2 On appeal from the trial court decision in favor of the in-
surer, the court held that the coverage as offered afforded protec-
tion to only a fraction of the persons entitled to recover under the
statute: "[Cloverage applicable to only a small portion of those in-
sured persons legally entitled to the same under the statute is a
subversion of the intent of the legislature, such intent being to af-
ford coverage to all insured persons who legally substantiate their
claims."" The court concluded that the policy exclusion was void as
a matter of law and would be given no effect."
Similarly, in Vernon Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. American
Underwriters, Inc.," the policy issued by American Underwriters
contained an exclusion which denied recovery to anyone not a named
insured or spouse of the named insured."6 Although the definition of
"insured" in the UM endorsement differed from the definition of "in-
sured" in the liability portion of the policy, the court chose not to
void the exclusion on the basis of inconsistency or ambiguity. In-
stead, the court concluded that the limitation was in derogation of
the UM act and held that the redefinition of "insured" for purposes
of such coverage was an attempt to narrow the protection mandated
by the statute and was therefore void. 7
In reaching these decisions, the Indiana courts have intruded
on both legislative and executive powers. The Indiana Uninsured
Motorists Act suggests that for purposes of coverage, "insured" is
to be defined by the terms of the policy issued by the insurer."
Likewise, once the policies are drafted, the provisions contained
therein are subject to the approval of the Commissioner of
Insurance." Since the policies in both Vernon and Cannon had been
approved by the Department of Insurance, the scope of judicial
the insured, at the time of the accident, was operating or occupying an insured
automobile." Id at 567.
62. See note 61 supra
63. 150 Ind. App. 21, 26, 275 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1971).
64. Id at 29, 275 N.E.2d at 571.
65. - Ind. App. -, 356 N.E.2d 693 (1976).
66. The exclusion that was the subject of controversy read: "The following
are insured under the uninsured motorist coverage: the named insured and lawful
spouse of such named insured if, and only if, such spouse is living with the named in-
sured at the time of the accident."
67. - Ind. App. -, -, 356 N.E.2d 693, 696 (1976).
68. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supra.
69. Id.
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review should have been confined to a determination of whether the
terms complied with the rules and principles of contract law. In-
stead, the courts first assumed a quasi-legislative role by grafting
judicial definitions onto the statute; then they assumed a quasi-
administrative role by disapproving of and voiding the policy provi-
sions.
While the Indiana courts may be criticized for an intrusion into
the legislative and executive prerogative, the conclusions reached
by the courts should not similarly be criticized. Clearly, such limita-
tions on the persons insured should be rejected because they serve
no legitimate purpose. First, such policy exclusions add unnecessary
confusion to the meaning of protection afforded and can only mislead
the unwary insured into believing he has received the coverage
sought. Second, while such limitations are designed to reduce the in-
surer's risk, they serve no valid business interest; the insurer is free
to simply raise the policy premiums commensurate with its increased
exposure. The broad language of the Standard Form"0 is certainly
preferable, and all other forms containing less coverage with respect
to the persons insured should be rejected. The problems posed by
insurers who issue policy forms with restrictions on the definition of
insured would be alleviated by requiring policy language at least
comparable with that of the Standard Form.71
Limitations on "Owned but Uninsured" Vehicles
A policy limitation that enjoys wide use by insurers in UM en-
dorsements is one that bars recovery to an insured while driving or
riding in any owned vehicle that is not insured."' The validity of
70. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Proposed Regulation No. 1 in Appendix, infra, page 339.
72. The Standard Form UM Endorsement provisions states:
This insurance does not apply under Part IV: (b) to bodily injury to an in-
sured while occupying a highway vehicle (other than an insured highway
vehicle) owned by the named insured, any designated insured or any
relative resident in the same household as the named insured, or through
being struck by such a vehicle ....
1966 STANDARD FORM, PART I: EXCLUSIONS. For text of the complete Standard Form
see WIDISS, note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969). To better understand the application of
this policy provision, consider the following hypothetical case. John Doe owns two
motor vehicles, a 1978 Mercury and a 1969 Ford pick-up truck. Because of the values of
the two vehicles, John fully insures the Mercury, including UM coverage, but pur-
chases no insurance at all on the pick-up truck. While driving to work in his truck,
John is struck and injured by an uninsured motorist. Application of the "owned but
uninsured" clause in the UM endorsement covering John's Mercury precludes recovery
of UM benefits under that policy.
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such provisions has been the subject of extensive litigation. The
courts of seventeen states have nullified the "owned but uninsured"
clause,"3 for the most part basing their decisions on some form of
public policy argument.
Most of the decisions have examined the underlying objective
of the UM statutes and have concluded that the legislative purpose
was to provide the injured party with the same coverage as he
would have been entitled to had the uninsured tortfeasor complied
with the financial responsibility act of the state. As a result, the
limitation is looked upon merely as an attempt to dilute the scope of
protection afforded by the UM statutes." One court in particular in-
validated the exception for owned but uninsured vehicles by em-
phasizing the harsh impact that UM accidents have on the public."
The courts of other jurisdictions have insisted that UM
coverage is aimed at the protection of the person and not the vehi-
cle, and that the intent of the legislature was not to limit coverage
to any insured by specifying the particular vehicle being occupied at
73. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Reaves, 292 Ala. 218, 292 So.
2d 95 (1974); Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobiles Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla.
1971); Gulf American Fire & Casualty Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, 154 S.E.2d 411
(1967); Doxtater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 547, 290
N.E.2d 284 (1972); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 156 Ind. App.
149, 295 N.E.2d 626 (1973); Forrester v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 213
Kan. 442, 517 P.2d 173 (1973); Elledge v. Warren, 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1972);
Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151
(1974); Lowery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 285 So. 2d 767 (Miss. 1973);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151 (1971);
Beck v. Ohio Casualty & Indemnity Co., 135 N.J. Super. 1, 342 A.2d 547 (1975); Chavez
v. State. Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100 (1975); Bankes v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 216 Pa. Super. 162, 264 A.2d 197 (1970);
Hogan v. Home Ins. Co., 260 S.C. 157, 194 S.E.2d 890 (1973); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meeks,
207 Va. 897, 153 S.E.2d 222 (1967); Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 80
Wash. 2d 327, 494 P.2d 479 (1972); Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., -
W. Va. -, 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974).
74. See, e.g., Touchette v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 80 Wash. 2d 327,
494 P.2d 479 (1972).
75. Thomas v. Nelson, 295 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1974).
76. In Mullis v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla.
1971), the court declared:
Bodily injury to a member of the public due to a motor vehicle accident,
whether produced by the negligence of an automobile liability insured or
by an uninsured motorist has the same financial loss impact on the in-
jured member of the public .... [Tihe injury is just as acute and damag-
ing to the member of the public whether he was injured as a pedestrian
or while riding in a public conveyance or in an 'uninsured automobile.'
Id, at 233.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/4
UM COVERAGE
the time of the accident." The purpose of the UM law is to
recompense innocent persons who are damaged through the
wrongful act of uninsured motorists. The coverage, it is argued, is
not actually liability insurance, but more closely resembles "limited
accident" insurance; that is, it insures against losses occasioned by a
limited group of tortfeasors. 8 In Elledge v. Warren,7 the focus of
the court's attention centered on the premiums charged by the in-
surer for UM coverage. The court reasoned that because the
premium charged for UM benefits was a flat rate, the coverage was
intended by the insurer to protect the insured at all times
regardless of the circumstances or the degree of risk of exposure to
an uninsured motorist accident. 0
While the jurisdictions invalidating the "owned but uninsured"
exclusion have relied heavily on the public's right to be protected,
those courts upholding the provision have stressed the construction
of the policy and the business interests of the insurance companies."'
For example, the exclusion has been upheld on the basis that it was
77. Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 301 Minn. 10, 221
N.W.2d 151 (1974); Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533
P.2d 100 (1975).
78. See Forrester v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 213 Kan. 442,
517 P.2d 173, 178 (1974); Hein v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 106 N.H. 378, 213 A.2d 197 (1965).
79. 263 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 1972).
80. In Elledge, the court stated:
The nature of the premium charged for this protection gives insight into
the coverage afforded. The rate is a flat one and coverage is available to
all persons at the same rate. The rate is unrelated to risks. By terms of
the policy, the policy holder and members of his family are covered ...
while guest passengers of an uninsured motorist who injures them.
This points to the fact that the intent of the coverage is to protect
an insured at all times. Once this definable scope of risks has been enlarg-
ed and extended to cover cases, at a flat rate, when the insured is a guest
passenger of the uninsured motorist, it follows that the intent of the
coverage is to protect the insured at all times against the generalized risk
of damage at the hands of the uninsured motorists and not to limit
coverage to certain situations or to a certain degree of risk of exposure to
the uninsured motorists.
Id. at 917-18.
81. Only the courts of eight states have upheld the use of the "owned but
uninsured" clause. Chambers v. Owens, 22 Ariz. App. 175, 525 P.2d 306 (1974);
Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973); Nunley v.
Turner, 57 Mich. App. 473, 226 N.W.2d 528 (1975); Barton v. American Family Ins. Co.,
485 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. App. 1972); Shipley v. American Standard Ins. Co., 183 Neb. 109,
158 N.W.2d 238 (1968); Cox v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 41 Ohio Misc. 128, 324
N.E.2d 304 (1974); Hill v. Nationwide Ins. Co., __ Tenn. - , 535 S.W.2d 327 (1976);
Stagg v. Travelers Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App. 1972).
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within the reasonable expectations of the parties.2 In most instances
a policyholder freely chooses not to insure all the vehicles owned by
him, if for no other reason than to save money. Although he might
expect the UM coverage of one insured vehicle to extend to all
other vehicles owned by him, such an expectation has been held to
be unreasonable. 8 Likewise, it has been held that a specific unam-
biguous policy provision in an endorsement controls the general pro-
visions of the policy and on that basis the "owned but uninsured"
clause has been enforced.8 '
Another argument that has found favor in some jurisdictions
goes to the business interests of the insurers. To nullify the "owned
but uninsured" clause would be to require the insurance company to
extend coverage free of charge. 5 Insurance premiums are adduced
by an actuarial allocation of risks. By invalidating this policy exclu-
sion the owner of four vehicles could protect four licensed drivers
simultaneously against financial loss caused by uninsured motorists
by merely insuring one vehicle and paying one premium." Ascrip-
tion to such a rule forces the insurance companies to become
"gratuitous guarantors."8 7 The insurer has at stake valid business in-
terests and has a right to manage its risks and collect a premium for
the coverage extended. 8
Judicial treatment of the use of the "owned but uninsured"
clause in Indiana has lacked discussion of the business interests of
the insurance companies. Instead, the courts have examined the ex-
clusion only in light of the Indiana UM statute. In Vantine v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,"8 the plaintiffs decedent was killed in a
highway accident when the decedent's owned but uninsured motor-
cycle" collided with an uninsured third party. Relying upon the ex-
82. Owens v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 15 Ariz. App. 181, 487 P.2d 402 (1971).
83. Shipley v. American Standard Ins. Co., 183 Neb. 109, 158 N.W.2d 238, 240
(1968).
84. Barton v. American Family Ins. Co., 485 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. App. 1972).
85. Nunley v. Turner, 57 Mich. App. 473, 226 N.W.2d 528 (1975).
86. Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Co., 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973).
87. Chambers v. Owens, 22 Ariz. App. 175, 525 P.2d 306, 309 (1974).
88. Hill v. Nationwide Ins. Co., __ Tenn. ., 535 S.W.2d 327 (1976); Stagg
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 486 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App. 1972).
89. 335 F. Supp. 1296 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
90. The involvement of an uninsured motorcycle has, in some cases, provided
courts with a means of easily resolving the controversy. Instead of coming to grips
with the validity of the "owned but uninsured" clause, they have simply ruled that a
motorcycle is not an automobile and therefore not subject to the exclusion for "owned
but uninsured automobiles." See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. West, 294 Minn. 368, 201
N.W.2d 133 (1972); Insurance Co. of North America v. Godwin, 46 App. Div. 2d 154,
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 [1979], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss2/4
UM COVERAGE
clusion in its policy, the insurer denied recovery of UM benefits.
The federal district court, however, rejected the exclusion, holding
that it was in violation of the UM act and contrary to public policy.
The court reasoned that the statute mandates coverage for the pro-
tection of insured persons and the requirement must be observed
regardless of the proprietary or insurance interest of the insured
person at the time of the accident."
Likewise, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Robert-
son,92 the Indiana Court of Appeals concluded that the "owned but
uninsured" clause was invalid. The facts of the case closely resemble
those of Vantine. The plaintiffs decedent was killed while operating
an owned but uninsured motorcycle. When State Farm invoked the
policy exclusion and denied coverage, the insured filed suit. In affir-
ming the decision of the trial court to void the provision, the court
relied on the reasoning of the district court in Vantine:
A contrary rule would violate clear public policy, serve no
legitimate business interest, and conflict with better
reasoned law. Defendant's argument, as one court observed,
would create the anomalous situation of precluding
coverage where the insured happens to be using an owned,
non-insured vehicle, while permitting recovery if the in-
sured were injured riding a declared vehicle, or on
horseback, or on his front porch . . ..
It is clear that the decisions interpreting Indiana law are aligned
with those courts that have rejected the "owned but uninsured"
clause.
Despite the cogent reasoning of these decisions and the im-
pressive roster of cases from other jurisdictions supporting this
position, use of the exclusion should be permitted. When the provi-
sion is voided, insurance companies become unreasonably exposed to
risks not contemplated when the policy was issued. Moreover, the
increased exposure is not commensurate with the amount of
premium collected. This is an undue infringement on the insurer's
valid business interests and completely fails to consider the com-
panies' right to protect themselves from those individuals who
361 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1974). The trend in most courts, including Indiana, has been to
forego this simiplistic analysis and address the substantive issue of validity.
91. 335 F. Supp. 1296, 1298 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
92. 156 Ind. App. 149, 295 N.E.2d 626 (1973).
93. Id at 629, quoting Vantine v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 335 F. Supp.
1296 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
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would reap the benefits of coverage without first paying for it. In
addition, there is a countervailing public policy consideration that
the courts have overlooked. By permitting the insured to recover
UM benefits by merely insuring one of several owned vehicles, the
courts are affording the protection of a law to persons who are
themselves not in compliance with that law. It is for these reasons
that insurers must be permitted to use and enforce the "owned but
uninsured" clause.
Limitations on Other Insurance
The "other insurance" clause of the Standard Form UM En-
dorsement has been the subject of extensive litigation. This policy
provision is composed of two separate paragraphs: the "excess-
escape" clause9" and the "pro-rata" clause.'"These policy limitations
are applicable in those instances when a person, injured through the
negligence of an uninsured motorist, is an "insured" within the
meaning of more than one policy of insurance.9 7 The "excess-escape"
94. See Proposed Regulation No. 2 in Appendix, infra, page 339.
95. The "excess-escape" clause reads as follows:
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall apply
only as excess insurance over any similar insurance available to such in-
sured and applicable to such automobile as primary coverage, and this in-
surance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability
for this coverage exceeds the applicable limits of such other insurance
policy.
1966 STANDARD FORM, PART VI: ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS (E. Other Insurance). For text
of complete Standard Form, see WIDISS, note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969).
96. The "pro-rata" clause provides that:
Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph [referring to the excess-
escape clause], if the insured has other insurance available to him and ap-
plicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the
higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other
insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of
any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability
hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of the liability of this
insurance and such other insurance.
1966 STANDARD FORM. PART VI: ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS (E. Other Insurance). For text
of complete Standard Form see WIDISs, note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969).
97. It is not at all uncommon for a person to have UM coverage available to
him under several different policies of insurance at any one given time. By way of il-
lustration, consider the following hypothetical situation. Joe Roe owns a 1975 Ford and
the policy of insurance covering the vehicle contains the standard UM endorsement.
Joe Roe also owns a 1973 Chevrolet, and this vehicle too is insured and its policy in-
cludes the UM endorsement. While a guest passenger in a vehicle owned and driven
by John Doe, they are struck by an uninsured motorist and Joe is seriously injured.
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clause effectively eliminates the insurer's liability if the insured is
injured while occupying a non-owned automobile by declaring the
coverage to be in excess of the coverage afforded by the host's
policy, but only up to the limits of liability of the primary policy.98
The "pro-rata" clause, on the other hand, applies in any case other
than where the insured is occupying a non-owned vehicle. Under
such coverage, the loss is pro-rated among the various insurers, the
maximum recovery not to exceed the limit of liability of the policy
affording the greater coverage. 9
As a general rule, both the "excess-escape" clause and the "pro-
rata" clause have met with much judicial opposition. In the decisions
voiding these provisions, courts have resorted to the use of several
rationales., Some jurisdictions, for example, have applied the doc-
trines of contract law and ruled that payment for each policy
coverage necessitates recovery under each policy.'" That is, once
the insurer has collected an additional premium for the UM endorse-
ment, it would be unconscionable to permit the insurer to partake of
By definition, Joe is not only an "insured" under each of the policies covering his own
vehicles but he is also an "insured" under the policy covering his host's vehicle. Thus,
there are three applicable policies covering Joe's injuries. Assuming that each policy
provides UM coverage in the amount of $15,000, Joe may have available to him a total
of $45,000 for compensatory purposes.
98. Continuing the hypothetical from note 97 supra, assume that Joe's injuries
total $25,000. Because Joe was a passenger in John's car at the time of the accident
with the uninsured motorist, the insurance policy covering John's car is the "primary"
policy. This means that Joe will receive the full $15,000 UM benefit from the policy in-
suring John's auto. The "excess-escape" clause in both of the policies covering Joe's
own cars, however, precludes any recovery from them because Joe's policies provide
only "excess" coverage. Thus Joe will recover only a total of $15,000 even though his
injuries totalled $25,000.
99. In the event that Joe Roe, note 98 supra, is injured by an uninsured
motorist while operating one of his two owned and insured vehicles, the "pro-rata"
clause in each of his two policies would become operative. Thus, even though Joe's in-
juries total $25,000, the maximum he would collect is the higher limit of liability of the
two policies. Assuming, then, that each policy has UM limits of $15,000, the most that
Joe would collect under each policy is $7,500 (each policy contributing one-half of the
total limit of $15,000). Again, Joe would recover only a total of $15,000 of his $25,000
loss.
100. Kraft v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 276, 431 P.2d 917 (1967); Walton v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 55 Hawaii 326, 518 P.2d 1399 (1974);
Harleysville Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968).
The position adopted by these courts is that the only limitation on the amount of
recovery is the total combined limits of all applicable policies, but in no event to ex-
ceed the actual damages incurred by the injured party. Double recovery, therefore, is
not permitted.
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a windfall by avoiding liability through the application of an exclu-
sionary clause."'
A number of jurisdictions have employed statutory arguments
and have voided these exclusions on the basis that they are repug-
nant to the UM statutes.02 The premise underlying this rationale is
that the statutes are enacted to protect innocent victims from the
uninsured motorist and to pay "all sums" which the victims are
legally entitled to recover.113 These courts argue that it is entirely
undesirable to permit the insurer to escape its statutory obligation
by redi.cing or eliminating coverage when the injured party has not
been fully compensated for all his damages. 0' Still other decisions
reflect the use of what may be termed the "plain meaning" ra-
tionale. The courts employing this reasoning stress the statutory re-
quirement that "each policy" of insurance provide UM coverage to
the minimum limits of the applicable financial responsibility law ir-
respective of the existence of other insurance."' As a result, the
"other insurance" clause is only enforced by the majority of courts
to prevent double recovery by the injured party.'
Those jurisdictions that have upheld the validity of the "other
insurance" clause have generally done so on the basis of statutory
interpretation."7 Employing a strict reading of the language of the
101. Curran v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co., 393 F. Supp. 712 (D. Alaska 1975); Van
Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
102. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jones, 133 Ga. App. 920, 213
S.E.2d 73 (1975); Clayton v. Alliance Mutual Casualty Co., 212 Kan. 640, 512 P.2d 507
(1973); Ramsour v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 541 P.2d 35 (Wyo. 1975).
103. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Jones, 286 Ala. 606, 243 So. 2d 736 (1970). In
that decision the court noted that the Alabama act:
[S]ets a minimum amount of recovery, but it does not place a limit on the
total amount of recovery so long as that amount does not exceed the
amount of actual loss; that where the loss exceeds the limits of one policy,
the insured may proceed under other available policies ....
Id at 742 (emphasis supplied).
104. See, e.g., Protective Fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Woten, 186 Neb. 212, 181
N.W.2d 835 (1970).
105. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Vanover, 506 S.W.2d 517 (Ky.
App. 1974); Harthcock v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 456 (Miss.
1971).
106. McFarland v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 120 N.J. Super. 554, 295
A.2d 375 (1972). See also Goodman v. Continental Casualty Co., 347 A.2d 662 (Del.
Super. 1975); Kaufman v. Economy Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 3d 940, 368 N.E.2d 371 (1977).
107. Morelock v. Millers Mutual Ins. Assoc., 49 Ill. 2d 234, 274 N.E.2d 1 (1971);
Werner v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 55 Mich. App. 390, 222 N.W.2d 254 (1974); State
Auto Mutual Ins. Co. v. Cummings, __ Tenn. -, 519 S.W.2d 773 (1975).
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UM statutes, these courts reason that the acts are designed to pro-
vide the insured with no greater coverage than he would have had if
the collision had taken place with a person insured only to the
minimum amount required by the particular financial responsibility
law.' °8 The Colorado Supreme Court has persuasively argued that
had the legislature intended complete indemnification it would not
have granted the insured the option of totally rejecting UM
coverage. 09 Since the insured is given the opportunity to purchase
either the minimum insurance coverage mandated by law, additional
coverage, or no coverage at all, there can be no basis for in-
validating the "other insurance" limitations. "
The decisions interpreting Indiana law have concluded that the
"other insurance" provision conflicts with the Indiana UM statute
and have voided both the "excess-escape" clause and the "pro-rata"
clause. In Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,"' the
plaintiff was injured while a guest passenger in a non-owned vehicle.
The insurer of the host vehicle paid the maximum UM benefit
available under its policy but that was insufficient to pay for all of
Simpson's injuries. A claim was filed with State Farm, the insurer of
two vehicles owned by the Simpsons, but coverage was denied based
upon the "excess-escape" clause of the State Farm policy."' There-
after, suit was filed and the district court held that the exclusion
was void as a matter of law. The court concluded that the Indiana
UM statute sets only the minimum and not the maximum limits of
recovery. " ' In addition, the court noted that the statute requires
each policy to include UM protection and, since a premium had been
paid for each applicable policy endorsement, the insured was entitl-
ed to benefits from all available policies."'
108. Transportation Ins. Co. v. Wade, 106 Ariz. 269, 475 P.2d 253 (1970);
Lemrick v. Grinnel Mutual Reinsurance Co., - Iowa - , 263 N.W.2d 714 (1978);
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965). It should be em-
phasized that because in most instances the language of the various UM statutes is
almost identical the determination of whether the statute sets a "minimum" or "max-
imum" limit on recovery by the insured depends largely on the approach of the court
interpreting the act.
109. See Alliance Mutual Casualty Co. v. Duerson, 184 Colo. 117, 518 P.2d 1177
(1974).
110. Id. at 1180.
111. 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
112. The clause invoked by the insurer in the Simpson case was the same as
that of the Standard Form UM Endorsement set out in note 95 supra.
113. 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
114. Id. at 1156.
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The "excess-escape" clause was afforded the same treatment
by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co."' In
that case, the Pattons were passengers in a non-owned automoblie
when it was struck by an uninsured motorist. Recovery was had
from the host's UM policy but the amount received was far less than
their actual damages. A claim was filed against Safeco, the insurer
of the Pattons' owned vehicle, for UM benefits. Safeco contended
that recovery was barred by the "excess-escape" clause in their
policy."' In finding that the exclusion was invalid, the court held:
If the legislature had intended to limit the recovery of
persons injured by an uninsured motorist to the limits of
one policy . . . the act would be directed at the injured
parties and not at each policy of insurance.
[T]herefore, an insured shall not be limited to the unin-
sured motorist provision of the one policy .... "'
It thus appears that at the present time insurers in Indiana are not
going to be permitted to enforce the "excess-escape" clause when
the injured party has not been fully compensated.
The validity of the "pro-rata" clause in Indiana, however, is in
some ways unsettled. In United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Runnels,"8 the plaintiff was struck and injured by an uninsured
motorist while operating his own insured automobile. Runnels sus-
tained damages in excess of the UM limits of one of his automobile
policies. As a result, he also sought benefits under a second UM
policy issued to him by Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau denied full
recovery under both policies on the basis of the "pro-rata" clauses
contained in both policies."9 In finding the "pro-rata" clauses invalid,
the court held that they had the effect of reducing the insurer's
liability on any one policy to less than the minimum amount man-
dated by the UM act and therefore were in derogation of the UM
statute. 120
115. 148 Ind. App. 548, 267 N.E.2d 859 (1971).
116. The clause in the UM policy issued by Safeco was the same as that of the
Standard Form UM Endorsement set out in note 95 supra.
117. 148 Ind. App. 548, 555, 267 N.E.2d 859, 864 (1971).
118. - Ind. App. -, - 382 N.E.2d 1015 (1978).
119. The "pro-rata" clause involved in Runnels was the same as that of the
Standard Form UM Endorsement set out in note 96 supra.
120. - Ind. App. , -, 382 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (1978). It must be noted that
the court continues to recognize that an insurer might avoid the result of having to
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The arguments advanced by these Indiana decisions and the
courts of other states that have invalidated the "other insurance"
clause are specious in nature. There is nothing unconscionable about
charging a premium for UM coverage and then limiting the coverage
when, in fact, the premium charged is based upon the very existence
of the policy limitations. The limited coverage received is a valid
quid pro quo for the relatively small premium paid. Moreover, little
recognition has been given to the fact that UM statutes are intended
to fill a void left by the financially irresponsible driver. The
language employed by the legislature does not mandate that UM
coverage overflow the insurance vacuum created by the uninsured
motorist. The act requires only that an amount equal to the financial
responsibility act be offered,'2 ' and even that amount may be re-
jected by the insured.'2 Indeed, the Indiana Court of Appeals in
Capps v. Klebs'22 declared that: "The purpose of the uninsured
motorist statute is to require a minimum amount of insurance be
available to an injured insured which would place him in substantially
the same position he would have occupied had the offending party
complied with the minimum requirements of the financial respon-
sibility act."'2 4 Although this statement might be said to reflect what
the court perceives to be the purpose of the Indiana UM act, it is
abundantly clear that the courts in Indiana do not look upon the act
as mandating only the "minimum requirements" of coverage. In-
stead, they have required insurers to provide benefits far in excess
of those that the injured party would have received had the tort-
feasor been insured to the minimum limits.' 5 Finally, the question of
pay UM benefits under both policies if instead a single policy is issued covering
several vehicles. Id. at 1018. This is in line with the dicta contained in Jeffries v.
Stewart, 159 Ind. App. 701, 309 N.E.2d 448 (1974), where it was noted that a single
policy containing an unambiguously stated "separability clause" would preclude the
"stacking" of the limits of more than one policy. Indeed, there have been four federal
cases interpreting Indiana law that have recognized the distinction between issuing
multiple policies and a single policy with multiple vehicles insured thereunder. See
Miller v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 506 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1974); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Capps, 506 F.2d 16 (7th Cir. 1974); Dunn v. Meridian Mutual Ins.
Co., Civil No. 71 H 329 (N.D. Ind. November 16, 1972); Rozina v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., Civil No. 69 H 257 (N.D. Ind. September 15, 1970).
121. IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976), note 7 supra.
122. Id.
123. - Ind. App. - , 382 N.E.2d 947 (1978).
124. Id. at 951 (emphasis supplied). See also Bocek v. Inter-Insurance Ex-
change, - Ind. App. . - .369 N.E.2d 1093, 1097 (1977), note 17 supra.
125. See Simpson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152
(S.D. Ind. 1970); United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Runnels , - Ind. App. -,
382 N.E.2d 1015 (1978); United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wolfe, __ Ind. App.
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public policy is largely a fabrication of the courts. Construing the in-
surance contract accurately and giving it the effects its language
unambiguously commands "is not ipso facto a breach of the public
policy merely because it disappoints the innocent victim of an unin-
sured motorist."" It would seem, then, that the "other insurance"
provision is valid and the insurer should be permitted to use and en-
force it. The proposed regulation appropriately adopts this
position."
The Medical Payments Set-Off Clause
Many insurance policies providing indemnification for injuries
sustained as a result of an accident with an uninsured motorist con-
tain a medical payments set-off or reduction clause.'28 The clause in
essence declares that any amount recoverable under the UM en-
dorsement shall be reduced by all amounts payable under the
medical payments benefit of the same policy."
There has been relatively little litigation concerning this set-off
provision. Those courts that have recognized the validity of this
clause have justified their position on the parties' freedom to con-
tract,' " reasoning that policies expressly setting forth set-off provi-
, 382 N.E.2d 1018 (1978); Patton v. Safeco Ins. Co., 148 Ind. App. 548, 267 N.E.2d
859 (1971).
126. Putnam. v. New Amsterdam Ins. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 71, 269 N.E.2d 97, 104-05
(1970).
127. See Proposed Regulation No. 3 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
128. The Standard Form UM Endorsement contains the following provision:
The company shall not be obligated to pay under this insurance that part
of the damages which the insured may be entiteld to recover from the
owner or operator of an uninsured highway vehicle which represents ex-
penses for medical services paid or payable under the medical payments
coverage of the policy.
1966 STANDARD FORM, PART III: LIMITS OF LIABILITY. For text of complete Standard
Form, see. Wmiss, note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969).
129. By way of illustration, John Doe, while operating his own insured
automobile, is struck and injured by an uninsured motorist. John's insurance provides
medical payment coverage of $5,000 and UM coverage of $15,000. John's total damages
are $20,000. Under the medical payments set-off clause of the UM endorsement, John's
insurer may pay $5,000 under the medical payment coverage and then deduct that sum
from the $15,000 payable under the UM provision. As a result, John will collect a total
of $15,000 ($5,000 from the medical payment coverage and $10,000 from the UM
benefits) as opposed to the full $20,000 he incurred in damages.
130. Boehler v. Insurance Co. of North America, 290 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Ark.
1968). However, see Bacchus v. Farmers Ins. Group, 106 Ariz. 280, 475 P.2d 264 (1970),
which, while recognizing the insurer's contractual right to limit the policy, never-
theless held that the medical payments set-off clause was in derogation of the Arizona
UM statute.
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sions should be construed as written and not subject to judicial revi-
sion."'
However, the developing judicial trend is to permit enforce-
ment of the medical payments set-off clause only in cases in which it
acts to prevent the injured party from recovering twice.' Two
arguments are commonly used to void this provision. First, it is con-
tended that such reductions dilute the purpose of the UM statutes.",
That is, any attempt to reduce the benefits below the statutory
minimum erodes the intent of the enactment."U Second, the medical
payments coverage and the UM coverage are two entirely separate
policy provisions that require payment of individual premiums. Each
is a separate insuring agreement and as such the insured is entitled
to recovery under both sections. 5 At least one court has employed
a combination of these two arguments and held that the fact that
the motorist protects himself by purchasing separate medical in-
surance does not alter the mandatory UM coverage imposed by the
statute. A policy provision that the insured considers to be addi-
tional coverage and for which a separate premium has been
tendered cannot be transferred into a reduction of the mandatory
UM coverage."
Indiana courts have not spoken to the validity of the medical
payments set-off clause. However, two federal district courts inter-
preting Indiana law have rendered decisions on the issue. In both in-
stances the provision was invalidated. In Wittig v. United Services
Automobile Ass'n.,"' the threshhold question before the court was
131. In Morgan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 195 So. 2d 648, 649
(La. App. 1967), the court held that "insurers have the same right as individuals to
limit their liability and to impose whatever conditions they please upon their obliga-
tions, and in such event unambiguous provisions limiting liability must be given
effect."
132. See L'Manian v. American Mutual Ins. Co., 4 Conn. Cir. 524, 236 A.2d 349
(1967); Glidden v. Farmers Auto Ins. Ass'n, 57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974); Silas
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 129 N.J. Super. 99, 322 A.2d 464 (1974).
133. Pleitgen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 296 Minn. 191, 207 N.W.2d 535 (1973);
Talbot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 291 So. 2d 699 (Miss. 1974); Shearer
v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co., 53 Ohio St. 2d 1, 371 N.E.2d 210 (1978); Westchester Fire
Ins. Co. v. Tucker, 512 S.W.2d 679 (Tex. 1974).
134. Keyes v. Beneficial Ins. Co., 39 Mich. App. 450, 197 N.W.2d 907 (1972);
Webb v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 479 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App. 1972).
135. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Humphrey, 54 Ala.
App. 343, 308 So. 2d 255 (1975); Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181,
207 N.W.2d 348 (1973).
136. Koneval v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., 48 Ohio App. 2d 77, 355 N.E.2d
529 (1976).
137. 300 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
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whether the plaintiff had satisfied the requisite jurisdictional
amount in controversy of $10,000.' The plaintiff had been injured
by an uninsured motorist while riding her bicycle. The insurer con-
tended that under the policy of insurance the maximum recoverable
amount was the $10,000 UM benefit and as such the jurisdictional
amount could never be satisfied.1 39 After reviewing the insurance
policy, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction because it was
possible that the plaintiff could recover from both the UM provision
and the medical payments portion of the policy.'40 The construction
and language of the applicable policy provisions, it was held, did not
impose a reduction of the UM benefits but was only applicable to
prevent double recovery by the plaintiff."'
Although the Wittig decision was the first step taken in
Indiana to strike down the medical payments set-off clause, it is of
little precedential value because it relied solely on the language and
construction of a particular policy. However, in Simpson v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,' 2 the court significantly expanded
its basis for decision and found such set-off clauses in derogation of
the Indiana UM statute. The court concluded that the Indiana act
sets no maximum limit of recovery, and that since separate
premiums had been paid for the UM and medical payments benefits,
the medical payments could not be deducted from the UM
coverage.'
A review of the cases in which the "other insurance" clause
was invalidated'" reveals that the arguments advanced by the
138. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976), provides in part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 ex-
clusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different states;
139. In 1969 the Indiana Safety-Responsibility Act, IND. CODE § 9-2-1-15 (1976),
mandated a minimum liability limit of $10,000 per person. In Wittig, the policy in issue
provided UM benefits only in the minimum amount. In 1971, the Indiana legislature
amended the Safety-Responsibility Act and increased the minimum limit to $15,000 per
person.
140. In Wittig, the plaintiff could conceivably have recovered a total of
$12,000-$2,000 from the applicable medical payments coverage and $10,000 from the
UM benefits-and therefore have met the minimum jurisdictional requirement for
amount in controversy.
141. Wittig v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 300 F. Supp. 679, 681 (N.D. Ind.
1969).
142. 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
143. Id. at 1156.
144. See notes 95-106, 111-27 supra and accompanying text.
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courts to reject that clause are identical to those reasons posited by
the courts to void the medical payments set-off provision. However,
while it was concluded that the "other insurance" clause should be
enforced,"" the medical payments set-off clause should nevertheless
be voided. Accepting the premise that the UM statute is aimed at
providing only the minimum limits imposed by the Safety-
Responsibility Act,"' it must be stressed that there remains one fun-
damental justification for permitting recovery of both UM benefits
and medical payments benefits. The medical payments benefit is a
first-party coverage, " 7 and as such it is payable to the insured
without regard to fault or the insurance status of the tortfeasor. Not
only is a separate premium paid for the medical payments coverage,
but it is a totally separate and different insuring agreement.
Moreover, in the event of an accident with an insured vehicle, the
injured party may obtain indemnification from his own medical
payments coverage as well as from the negligent tortfeasor's in-
surance company. Since most medical payments provisions do not in-
clude subrogation or set-off clauses, not permitting the injured party
to receive both the medical payments and UM benefits would render
him less recovery than if the tortfeasor had been insured to the
minimum limits of the financial responsibility act. " 8 The medical
payments set-off clause should therefore not be enforced. " 9
The Workmen's Compensation Set-Off Clause
The workmen's compensation set-off clause 5' closely resembles
the set-off clause for medical payments. The clause provides that
any amount payable under the UM coverage of the automobile
145. See Proposed Regulation No. 3 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
146. See notes 121-25 supra and accompanying text.
147. A first-party coverage is one that inures directly to the benefit of the in-
sured for damages sustained by him. This is in contrast to third-party coverage which
compensates other persons for damages sustained as the result of the liability of the
insured person.
148. WIDISS. note 10 supra, at § 2.65 (Supp. 1978).
149. See Proposed Regulation No. 4 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
150. The workmen's compensation set-off provision under the Standard Form
UM Endorsement states that:
Any amount payable under the terms of this insurance because of bodily
injury sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured under this
coverage shall be reduced by . . . (2) the amount paid and the present
value of all amounts payable under workmen's compensation law, disabili-
ty benefits law or any similar law.
1966 STANDARD FORM, PART III: LIMITS OF LIABILITY. For text of cumplete Standard
Form see WIDISS, note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969).
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policy shall be reduced by any sum payable under the state
workmen's compensation law. 151 Only a few jurisdictions have upheld
the provision. Some cases indicate that courts have been persuaded
by contract arguments and have enforced the clause on the ground
that its meaning is clear and unambiguous. 152 Other courts have ig-
nored the contract arguments and asserted that the UM statutes re-
quire only minimum coverage; so long as that amount is recovered,
regardless of the source, the legislative purpose has been satisfied."
Approximately twenty states have invalidated the workmen's
compensation set-off clause.'1 The rationales employed by these
courts are essentially the same as those invoked to set aside other
limiting provisions of the UM endorsement. Some cases stress that
the intent of the legislation is complete indemnification.'5 5 In those
cases where the total damage exceeds the UM benefits, deduction of
workmen's compensation benefits does not provide full indemnifica-
tion and the purpose of the UM statute is circumvented. A closely
151. To illustrate the operation of the workmen's compensation set-off clause,
consider the following hypothetical. Joe Coe, a city fireman, is injured while respon-
ding to a fire alarm when the fire truck he is operating is struck by an uninsured
motorist. Joe is, by definition under a policy insuring his own personal automobile, an
"insured" for purposes of UM benefits. Because Joe was injured while in the course of
his employment, he is also eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. Joe sustains
injuries in the amount of $17,000. Joe files a claim for maximum benefits under his UM
policy of $15,000. The workmen's compensation carrier, in the interim, pays total
benefits of $14,500. The UM insurer, by virtue of the workmen's compensation set-off
clause, is entitled to deduct the $14,500 sum from its $15,000 limit of liability under the
UM policy. The total UM benefit would be $500. This of course means that Joe still
has outstanding damages of $2,000 for which he has received no compensation.
152. See Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126
(1964); Durant v. MVAIC, 15 N.Y.2d 408, 260 N.Y.S.2d 1, 207 N.E.2d 600 (1965).
153. Ullman v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 48 Ill. 2d 1, 269 N.E.2d 295 (1970).
154. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 287 Ala. 251, 251 So. 2d 213
(1971); Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 252
Ark. 624, 480 S.W.2d 585 (1972); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hillyer, 32 Colo. App.
163, 509 P.2d 810 (1973); Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Gavin, 184 So. 2d 229 (Fla. App.
1966); Leist v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 160 Ind. App. 322, 311 N.E.2d 828 (1974); Gagnard
v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 1976); Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Ex-
change v. Ayvazian, 62 Mich. App. 94, 233 N.W.2d 200 (1975); Brunmeier v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 296 Minn. 328, 208 N.W.2d 860 (1973); Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins. Co.,
495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App. 1973); Sullivan v. Doe, 159 Mont. 50, 495 P.2d 193 (1972);
Sweeney v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 136 N.J. Super. 591, 347 A.2d 380
(1975); Bartlett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 33 Ohio St. 2d 50, 294 N.E.2d 665 (1973);
Rhodes v. Automobile Ignition Co., 218, Pa. Super. 281, 275 A.2d 846 (1971); Aldroft v.
Fidelity Casualty Co., 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408 (1969); Ferguson v. State Farm
Mutual Ins. Co., 261 S.C. 96, 198 S.E.2d 522 (1973); Hamaker v. American States Ins.
Co. of Texas, 493 S.W.2d 893 (Tex. App. 1973).
155. Sullivan v. Doe, 159 Mont. 50, 495 P.2d 193 (1972).
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related argument employed by courts in other jurisdictions is that
the deductions are methods of reducing the statutory minimum
coverage of the UM act.' One court adopted the position that the
UM statute contains no language authorizing such a deduction and
any attempt to do so is therefore invalid. 67 The Arkansas Supreme
Court applied a novel argument and voided the set-off provision on
the basis that it discriminates against those persons who work and
are protected under the workmen's compensation law." '
The Indiana Court of Appeals joined those states which do not
enforce the workmen's compensation set-off clause when it decided
Leist v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. 5' In that case, the plaintiff, in his
capacity as town marshall, was operating a town automobile when
he was struck and seriously injured by an uninsured motorist. Leist
recovered over $11,000 from the workmen's compensation carrier
and then sought recovery from the UM insurer to pay for the
balance of his damages. When Leist sought arbitration following
denial of his UM claim,"w the insurer obtained an injunction prevent-
ing the arbitration procedure. On appeal, the decision of the lower
court was reversed and the injunction dissolved. The court held that
the set-off provision violated the UM statute, stating that if the
legislature had intended to permit UM insurers to limit their liabili-
ty it would have done so specifically in the act.61
While the Leist decision focused on legislative intent to in-
validate the workmen's compensation set-off clause, the rationale
relied upon by most courts to invalidate the medical payment set-off
clause would appear to be not only applicable but more persuasive. 2
Like the benefits available under the medical payment coverage of
156. Gagnard v. Thibodeaux, 336 So. 2d 1069 (La. App. 1976); Steinhaeufel v.
Reliance Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 463 (Mo. App. 1973).
157. Aldroft v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 106 R.I. 311, 259 A.2d 408 (1969).
158. Travelers Ins. Co. v. National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Ins.
Co., 252 Ark. 624, 480 S.W.2d 585 (1972).
159. 160 Ind. App. 322, 311 N.E.2d 828 (1974).
160. The majority of automobile insurance policies contains a provision entitl-
ing either or both the insured and the insurer to seek arbitration of a dispute arising
between the parties as to the applicability of the coverage or the amount payable
thereunder. The demand for arbitration must be in writing and it is to be conducted
under the rules of the American Arbitration Association. In addition, the arbitration
clause provides that each party agrees to be bound by the award made by the ar-
bitrator and such award is enforceable in a court having jurisdiction over such mat-
ters.
161. Leist v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 160 Ind. App. 322, 311 N.E.2d 828 (1974).
162. See notes 146-49 supra and accompanying text.
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the automobile policy, workmen's compensation is a first party
coverage"e payable to any worker who sustains injury while in the
course of his employment duties. Workmen's compensation benefits
are a separate and independent source of indemnification, wholly
unrelated to an automobile policy or any benefits payable
thereunder. There is simply no sound reason to preclude recovery
from one source merely because the insured is fortunate enough to
have coverage under an independent insurance policy for which a
separate premium has been paid. As a result, a regulation should be
adopted proscribing reduction of benefits obtained from workmen's
compensation insurance. 6'
HIT-AND-RUN COVERAGE
The uninsured motorist endorsement, in addition to providing
coverage against bodily injury inflicted by an uninsured motorist, af-
fords protection against hit-and-run drivers.6 5 This coverage is
designed to cover those automobile accidents involving a party who
flees the scene and whose identity is not known. The hit-and-run
coverage, however, is often predicated on the fulfillment of certain
policy conditions. 6' These conditions, particularly the "physical con-
163. See note 147 supra.
164. See Proposed Regulation No. 5 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
165. The Standard Form UM Endorsement provides that an "uninsured vehi-
cle" also means a "hit-and-run vehicle." 1966 STANDARD FORM. PART V: ADDITIONAL
DEFINITIONS (Uninsured Vehicle). For text of complete form, see WIDIss, note 10 supra,
at App. A, 1 (1969).
166. The Standard Form coverage reads:
'[H]it and run vehicle' means a highway vehicle which causes bodily injury
to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the in-
sured or with the vehicle which the insured is occupying at the time of
the accident, provided:
(a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or
owner of such highway vehicle;
(b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the
accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer
or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed
within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured
or his legal representative has a cause or causes of action
arising out of such accident for damages against a person or
persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting forth facts
in support thereof; and
(c) at the company's request, the insured or his legal representative
makes available for inspection the vehicle which the insured was
occupying at the time of the accident.
1966 STANDARD FORM, PART V: ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS. Fox text of complete form, see
WIDISs. note 10 supra, at App. A, 1 (1969).
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tact" requirement and the "24 hour" and "30 day" notice provisions,
strictly limit this coverage and as a result have been the subject of
extensive controversy and litigation.
The Physical Contact Requirement
The physical contact clause requires that there be some contact
between the insured and uninsured vehicles. The purpose of this re-
quirement is to reduce the possibility of fraudulent claims.' 7 The
provision's value in foreclosing claims arising from accidents involv-
ing an insured and a fictitious "phantom" driver has been recognized
by the courts. 8' The statement of one court accurately outlines the
problem:
To open the door for all claims against unknown and
unidentified drivers, where no physical contact had occur-
red between the vehicle of the unknown party and the
claimant would open the door for all types of fraud ...
Appellee argues, it is as likely as not that if there is no
contact between the vehicles, the negligent tortfeasor is
fully insured but unaware that he caused the accident. If
there is physical contact and the driver leaves the scene,
one of the more likely reasons for his flight is because he
does not have insurance. The points may or may not be
true or appropriate, but the physical contact requirement
in the policy removes the need for such speculation. "
The validity of the physical contact requirement has been
challenged on a number of occasions. The argument most often ad-
vanced by injured parties is that the limitation contradicts the
underlying purpose of the UM statutes. However, because the hit-
and-run provision of the policy is actually a liberalization of most
UM enactments, 7 ' several courts have held that insurers are free to
167. The "hit-and-run" coverage is highly susceptible to abuse. For example, an
insured who negligently loses control of his vehicle and collides with a tree might later
claim that a hit-and-run motorist forced him off the road.
168. Huelsman v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. App. 1977);
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Fruchtman, - Minn. -, 263 N.W.2d 66
(1978).
169. Huelsman v. National Emblem Ins. Co. 551 S.W.2d 579, 582 (Ky. App.
1977).
170. See note 29 supra. In speaking to this matter, the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals in Cannon v. American Underwriters, Inc., 150 Ind. App. 21, 275 N.E.2d 567, 570
(1971), held:
Actually coverage is extended rather than curtailed and more persons are
covered than the statute requires. In addition to protecting persons legal-
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impose contractual limitations such as the physical contact require-
ment. 1' As a result, the physical contact limitation has generally
been recognized as valid and enforceable as long as it is expressed
in clear and unambiguous language. 7 ' Moreover, because the hit-and-
run clause is not generally required by statute, courts have expres-
sed a reluctance in some instances to rewrite the insurance contract
to bind the insurer to a risk which it did not contemplate or for
which it was not paid a premium. 3
Underlying the physical contact requirement is the compelling
interest in preventing fraudulent claims. Certainly the requirement
constitutes a reasonable limitation when it is employed to deter
fraud. However, on the basis of the physical contact requirement, in-
surers have argued that the term should be interpreted to bar
recovery in all cases where there has not been an "actual" touching
of the insured and uninsured vehicles. Given the sometimes harsh
results that can come about as a result of such a rigid standard,
many courts have responded by adopting a flexible definition of
"physical contact."
Indirect Physical Contact
The primary means adopted by the courts to expand the defini-
tion of physical contact is to include those incidents in which colli-
sions result from indirect contact with the runaway vehicle. For the
most part, courts have shown little reluctance to extend hit-and-run
coverage in those cases involving intermediate vehicles. 174 Courts
ly entitled to recover damages because of bodily injury by provably unin-
sured automobiles, the coverage afforded . . . also [gives] protection to
persons injured by drivers of hit and run automobiles ....
171. See Balestrieri v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 112 Ariz. 160, 540
P.2d 126 (1975); Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 295 Ark. 696, 535 S.W.2d 830
(1976); Rosnick v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 172 Conn. 416, 374 A.2d 1076 (1977);
Basilla v. Aetna Ins. Corp., 38 Mich. App. 260, 195 N.W.2d 893 (1972); Ward v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 514 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1974).
172. Grace v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 197 Neb. 118, 246
N.W.2d 874 (1976); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Reddick, 37 Ohio St. 2d 119, 308 N.E.2d 454
(1974); Phelps v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App. 1972).
173. Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813
(1969).
174. The most common hit-and-run accident involving intermediate vehicles is
the "chain reaction" type collision. In these circumstances, a hit-and-run vehicle
generally rearends the vehicle immediately ahead of it and that vehicle in turn rear-
ends the vehicle ahead of it, and so on. After setting the chain reaction in motion, the
hit-and-run driver flees the scene. Although the fleeing motorist made direct contact
with only one of the vehicles, indirect contact was made with all of the vehicles in the
chain.
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have consistently applied the rules of proximate causation in deter-
mining that recovery is proper in cases where the hit-and-run
motorist set the accident in motion."' The Louisiana Court of Ap-
peals best articulated the applicable test:
[T]he injury-causing impact must have a complete, prox-
imate, direct and timely relationship with the first impact
between the hit-and-run vehicle and the intermediate vehi-
cle. In effect, the impact must be the result of an un-
broken chain of events with a clearly definable beginning
and ending, occurring in a continuous sequence."'
It must be noted that this test does not totally obviate the "actual'!
physical contact requirement. Rather, it merely abrogates the re-
quirement that the "actual" contact take place between the unin-
sured motorist and the claimant vehicle. The indirect contact rule
still requires that the uninsured motorist make actual contact with
some other vehicle proximately involved in the accident.
Strict adherence to this test, however, would totally preclude
recovery in those cases involving physical contact with objects other
than intermediate vehicles. As a result, some jurisdictions have
refused to apply the test strictly and have determined that a stone
propelled by a hit-and-run vehicle which struck and killed the occu-
pant of another vehicle met the physical contact requirement
necessary for recovery.' Another court has held that there was suf-
ficient evidence to permit the case to go to the jury where the oc-
cupants of an unidentified vehicle tossed a sack of refuse onto the
highway causing the claimant to leave the road and flip his
automobile. 7'
The Indiana Court of Appeals has twice been confronted with
cases seeking to expand the term "physical contact" to include in-
175. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Spinola, 374 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.
1967) (applying Florida law); State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Carlson, 130 Ga.
App. 27, 202 S.E.2d 213 (1973); Ray v. Demaggio, 313 So. 2d 251 (La. App. 1975);
Shamrock Casualty Co. v. Mack, 61 Misc. 2d 240, 305 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1969); Latham v.
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co., 482 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. App. 1972).
176. Springer v. GEICO, 311 So. 2d 36, 39-40 (La. App. 1975).
177. Barfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 59 Tenn. App. 631, 443
S.W.2d 482 (1969). See also Smith v. Great American Ins. Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 233, 315
N.Y.S.2d 388 (1970), rev'd, 29 N.Y.2d 116, 324 N.Y.S.2d 15 (1971).
178. Craig v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 257 Ark. 751, 519 S.W.2d
741 (1975). Other courts, given the same factual circumstances, have refused to extend
the indirect contact doctrine. See, e.g., Gardner v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 114
Ariz. 123, 559 P.2d 679 (1977); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Head, 240 So. 2d 280
(Miss. 1970).
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direct contact. Initially, the court in Blankenbaker v. Great Central
Ins. Co., 79 adopted a very strict policy and totally rejected the in-
direct contact doctrine. However, in Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v.
Lamb,18 the court granted recovery, recognizing that indirect con-
tact is sufficient in certain circumstances. In Blankenbaker"8' the
claimants' vehicle struck a tire and rim assembly in the middle of
the highway and the occupants were seriously injured when the van
veered off the road and rolled over. There was no evidence
establishing how the assembly happened to be on the road. No other
vehicle was involved in the accident nor was any other vehicle in
the vicinity of the scene when the accident took place. The oc-
cupants filed a claim with the insurer seeking UM benefits. Follow-
ing denial of the claim, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment of
the policy terms. 8 '
The court of appeals, in affirming the decision of the trial court
that the claimants were not entitled to recovery, held that the oc-
currence of some type of physical contact between the hit-and-run
vehicle and the insured vehicle was necessary to enforcement of hit-
and-run claims. The court determined as a matter of law that the
tire and rim assembly was not a hit-and-run "vehicle" and recovery
was properly denied. By way of dicta, however, the court added that
it totally rejected the indirect contact doctrine as an attempt to
rewrite the contract between the parties."
The rigid position adopted in Blankenbaker was relaxed by the
court in Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Lamb.14 In that case, the
plaintiffs decedent was killed when an unidentified motor vehicle
propelled a stone through the windshield of the claimant automobile.
In reversing the decision of the trial court to deny relief, the court
of appeals held that the term "physical contact" in the hit-and-run
provision of the UM endorsement occurs when an unidentified vehi-
cle strikes an object and causes it to strike the insured vehicle.
Although the object clearly need not be another vehicle, the court
179. 151 Ind. App. 693, 281 N.E.2d 496 (1972).
180. - Ind. App. -, 361 N.E.2d 174 (1977).
181. 151 Ind. App. 693, 281 N.E.2d 496 (1972).
182. The declaratory judgment procedure is appropriate for the determination
of contractual rights of the insured and insurer alike. For a discussion of the use of
declaratory judgments to determine rights under a contract of insurance, see COUCH
ON INSURANCE 2d §§ 74:115-74:153 (1968).
183. Blankenbaker v. Great Central Ins. Co., 151 Ind. App. 693, 281 N.E.2d 496,
501 (1972).
184. - Ind. App. -, 361 N.E.2d 174 (1977).
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confined recovery to those instances when a "substantial physical
nexus" is established between the unidentified vehicle and the in-
termediate object." 5
Clearly, recovery of UM benefits should be granted in those
cases where the claimant can demonstrate that his injuries were the
direct and proximate result of a hit-and-run driver. In every case in-
volving indirect contact with the hit-and-run motorist there will be
some physical evidence of impact with either the intermediate vehi-
cle or some object. The only remaining issue, then, is the question of
proximate causation. As in any tort action, the parties should be en-
titled to have the trier of fact weigh the evidence presented and
determine whether the injuries sustained were the direct result of
the negligence of the defendant. Moreover, the. primary justification
for the physical contact requirement, fraud prevention, is of less im-
portance because there will be evidence supporting the occurrence
of the accident. In the case of the intermediate vehicle, the claimant
will have the advantage of the testimony of the driver of the vehicle
struck directly by the hit-and-run motorist. In the case of impact
with an object other than a vehicle there will inevitably be some
evidence of physical damage to the exterior of the vehicle.
Constructive Contact
A much more difficult case arises when the claimant, in his ef-
fort to avoid collision with either the hit-and-run driver, an in-
termediate vehicle, or some other intermediate object, takes evasive
action which results in bodily injury to the claimant. In such an in-
stance, although the hit-and-run driver made no direct or indirect
contact with the claimant, the argument will often be made that
there was a "constructive contact" warranting recovery under the
UM endorsement. ' Courts confronted with this theory have
demonstrated a pronounced reluctance to accept it. In such cases,
the trend of the courts is to strictly construe the contact require-
ment, thereby barring recovery. ' As a result of this strict construc-
tion, a bus passenger injured when the bus stopped suddenly to
185. Id. at 177.
186. Ferega v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 58 Ill. 2d 109, 317
N.E.2d 550 (1974); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Cooperman, 33 Ohio App. 2d 152, 293
N.E.2d 293 (1972).
187. Ward v. Consolidated Underwriters, 295 Ark. 696, 535 S.W.2d 830 (1976);
Osepchook v. Gateway Ins. Co., 298 So. 2d 169 (Fla. App. 1974); Basilla v. Aetna Ins.
Group, 38 Mich. App. 260, 195 N.W.2d 893 (1972); Grace v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., 197 Neb. 118, 246 N.W.2d 874 (1976).
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avoid striking a car that swerved into its path was denied recovery
despite there being a busload of passengers that could corroborate
the claimant's story.'88 Similarly, one court held that a claim was
properly denied where the driver and passengers of an automobile
were injured severely when they were forced off a narrow road by a
freight truck driving down the middle of the road at a high rate of
speed."8 9
The only reported case in Indiana on "constructive contact" is
Ely v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.'" In that case, the
plaintiff was a guest passenger in a vehicle wned and operated by
a friend. As the automobile approached a railroad trestle the driver
noticed a truck stopped in the middle of the road. As the driver ap-
plied his brakes, the automobile skidded on the muddy pavement
and struck a wall, seriously injuring the plaintiff. Following denial of
Ely's claim for UM benefits, he filed suit against State Farm. The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment for the insurer,
holding that there can be no recovery where there is neither direct
nor indirect contact. 9 ' Moreover, the court inexplicably noted that
recovery would still be barred even though the claimant could suffi-
ciently demonstrate that the hit-and-run vehicle was the proximate
cause of the accident. ' 2
Given the past approach of the Indiana cases, it is indeed ironic
that in interpreting the physical contact requirement the court of
appeals should reach so strict a conclusion. It would appear that the
public policy arguments so forcefully advanced in the past would be
even more appropriate in the contact cases. Where there is suffi-
cient evidence that the sequence of events which caused the injury
188. Collins v. New Orleans Public Service Co., 234 So. 2d 270 (La. App. 1970).
189. Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813
(1969).
190. 148 Ind. App. 586, 268 N.E.2d 316 (1971).
191. Id. at 320.
192.
The appellants alternatively argue that where there is a showing of prox-
imate causation the element of fraud is eliminated and recovery under the
policy should be granted notwithstanding the lack of actual physical con-
tact .... It is true that for a person injured in an automobile accident to
recover from the tortfeasor who caused the accident, physical contact is
not required. This is a matter of common law negligence. In this case,
however, the insured is attempting to recover from an insurer based upon
the provisions of a policy of insurance. The law of contract as opposed to
the law of negligence, is controlling here.
Id. at 322.
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was initially set in motion by an unknown hit-and-run driver, over-
riding public policy would seem to require recovery. The physical
contact requirement, with its underlying purpose of deterring
fraudulent claims, loses its integrity when there are disinterested
witnesses available to document the precise cause of the accident.
Invalidating the Physical Contact Requirement
Courts in many states now permit recovery of UM benefits in
the absence of physical contact, direct or indirect, with the hit-and-
run vehicle. For the most part, this course of action has been taken
to avoid the harsh and inequitable results that have occurred
because of strict compliance with the policy provisions. Two ra-
tionales are generally used to reach these decisions.
Some courts have urged that the purpose of the UM statutes is
to put the injured party in the same position he would have enjoyed
had the tortfeasor been insured.'93 Thus, so long as the hit-and-run
driver is the proximate cause of the accident, recovery should be
allowed. Other courts have rejected the physical contact require-
ment by holding that this limitation does not adequately protect
those individuals who are injured as a result of the actions of hit-
and-run motorists.'9 The hit-and-run coverage should not be con-
sidered in isolation, but rather in context with the totality and pur-
pose of the UM act.1 5
Courts in other jurisdictions have stated that there is no need
to require physical contact as a condition to recovery because the
trier of fact can determine whether the claim is in fact fraudulent. If
the injured party can sustain the burden of proving that an accident
did occur as the direct result of an encounter with a hit-and-run
motorist, he should be entitled to recovery regardless of the actuality
of contact.'" As one court stated: "Fear of fraudulent claims cannot
justify the judicial deprivation of the plaintiffs right to bring an in-
dependent action in tort because the genuineness of the claim can
193. Biggs v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 569 P.2d 430 (Okla.
1977); Abramowicz v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 369 A.2d 691 (Del.
Super. 1977).
194. Farmers Ins. Exchange v. McDermitt, 34 Colo. App. 305, 527 P.2d 918
(1974); Solle v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 116 N.H. 595, 364 A.2d 883 (1976).
195. Maurer v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, Inc., 18 Wash. App. 2d 197, 567 P.2d 253
(1977).
196. Montoya v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 394 F. Supp. 1337 (D.N.M. 1975); Brown v.
Progressive Mutual Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 1971); State Farm Fire & Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Lambert, 291 Ala. 645, 285 So. 2d 917 (1973).
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adequately be tested by the mechanisms of the adversary
process." '197 In addition, to require physical contact as a precondition
to recovery of UM benefits under the hit-and-run coverage is to con-
cede that an innocent victim of a hit-and-run motorist is much better
off to intentionally make physical contact rather than avoid the colli-
sion and sustain injury by rolling over or striking a tree.198 It would
seem that a general reconsideration of the propriety of the physical
contact requirement is warranted. This is not to suggest that the
floodgates to hit-and-run claims should be opened. The insurance
companies must be assured that there is adequate protection from
fraudulent claims. However, it seems that the adversary system
could provide the necessary safeguards. The claimant should have
the burden of proof of showing that the injuries sustained were the
direct and proximate result of the negligence of a hit-and-run driver
and the insurer should have the right to raise fraud and collusion as
a defense to any claim.'
The Twenty-four Hour Report Requirement
Most uninsured motorist endorsements contain a provision re-
quiring that hit-and-run accidents be reported to the police or some
other official within twenty-four hours after the occurrence of the
accident."°0 This requirement clearly serves a valid purpose. Prompt
reporting better enables police and other interested parties to
determine if and in what manner an accident occurred. The sooner
an accident is reported the more quickly interviews may be con-
ducted with witnesses and the scene investigated for post-accident
evidence. 0'
Although there are few reported cases involving the twenty-
four hour report requirement, it appears that compliance should be
viewed as essential to recovery. Failure to comply with the provi-
sion may result in total defeat of the right to UM benefits. 2 ' Some
197. Demello v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 55 Hawaii 519, 523 P.2d 304, 308
(1974). See also Webb v. United Services Auto Ass'n, 227 Pa. Super. 508, 323 A.2d 737
(1974).
198. P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 34.3A (1972).
199. See Proposed Regulation No. 6 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
200. For the text of the Standard Form setting forth the 24 hour notice re-
quirement, see note 166 supra.
201. California State Auto Ass'n v. Blanford, 4 Cal. App. 3d 187, 84 Cal. Rptr.
333 (1970).
202. Barfield v. Insurance Co. of North America, 59 Tenn. App. 631, 443
S.W.2d 482 (1969).
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courts have recognized the report requirement as a valid condition
precedent to recovery.
203
In the event that an insured fails to comply with the report re-
quirement, the claim is not always automatically lost.2 ' Before the
insurer will be permitted to deny the claim, there must be evidence
that the insurer has been prejudiced by the insured's failure to
report the accident within twenty-four hours after the accident. The
late report nevertheless does give rise to a rebuttable presumption
that there has been some prejudice to the insurance company. 20 5
This means that the insured seeking recovery bears the burden of
demonstrating that the insurer was not in any way prejudiced. ' "
Although the reporting requirement has a valid purpose, in
some instances the provision and the attendant burdens associated
with failure to comply with it can be particularly unreasonable. It is
conceivable that a motorist could become involved with a hit-and-run
driver on a deserted secondary road and not be found until after the
exhaustion of the twenty-four hour period. Under such cir-
cumstances, strict adherence to the reporting requirement would
result in loss of the insured's right of recovery under the policy. At
best, the insured would be subjected to a difficult burden of persua-
sion to show that the insurer had not been prejudiced. The better
approach would be to relax the twenty-four hour requirement by
permitting compliance as soon as practicable under the cir-
cumstances. 21 By expanding the requirement in this manner, in-
equitable and harsh results may be avoided. As a result, the in-
sured's burden of showing that the insurer was not prejudiced by
the late report would not be imposed until after a showing that the
report was not made as soon as practicable after the occurrence of
the accident. The rights of the insurance company will not be
seriously jeopardized and the insured will be given a fair opportunity
to pursue his claim.'08
The Thirty Day Notification to Insurer Requirement
In addition to the physical contact requirement and the time
limitation imposed on reporting the hit-and-run accident, the Stan-
203. McKay v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 393 (Fla. App. 1974); State Farm
County Mutual Ins. Co. v. Landers, 520 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App. 1974).
204. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Korschin, 350 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. App. 1977).
205. Barnes v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 1065 (Fla. App. 1977).
206. Torres v. Protective National Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 109 (Fla. App. 1978).
207. Bolton v. Doe, 266 S.C. 344, 223 S.E.2d 187 (1976).
208. See Proposed Regulation No. 7 in Appendix, infra, page 340.
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dard UM Endorsement requires the insured to file with the insurer
a statement under oath within thirty days from the time of the acci-
dent that he has a legitimate cause of action against the hit-and-run
motorist.'" As a general rule, failure to do so will relieve the com-
pany of liability. 1 ' However, as with the twenty-four hour report re-
quirement, the insurer must have been prejudiced before the failure
to comply can be used to bar the claim.2 ' Likewise, prejudice will be
presumed in the event of late notice, and the claimant has the
burden of demonstrating that the company was not prejudiced.212
Because claimants fail too often to read carefully their in-
surance policies to ascertain what affirmative steps must be taken
to preserve their claim, some courts have found means of providing
the insured with some latitude in meeting this requirement. One
court held that since the insurer had notice of the accident about
one month after its occurrence, it had waived its rights to strict
compliance of the oath provision.2"3 In another case, the court held
the insurer waived its rights to a statement under oath when it failed
to make a response to a letter sent to it by the claimant's attorney
within the thirty day period. 1 4
While the oath requirement may be of some value in deterring
possible fraudulent claims, it should not be used as a means of deny-
ing a claim merely because the insured was not aware of the re-
quirement. This is particularly true in those cases where the acci-
dent is reported in a timely manner to the insurance company and
209. The 30 day notification clause is set out in note 166 supra.
210. Latham v. Mountain States Ins. Co., 482 S.W.2d 655, 657 (Tex. App. 1972).
211. Hanover Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 241 Cal. App. 2d 558, 50 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1966).
212. Laster v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 293 So. 2d 83 (Fla. App.
1974).
213. In McMahon v. Coronet Ins, Co., 6 Il. App. 3d 704, 286 N.E.2d 631 (1972),
the court held:
As a technical matter, it is true that plaintiffs did not comply with the
strict letter of the policy provisions by filing the sworn statement within
30 days .... This provision was placed in the policy for the benefit of Cor-
onet. Therefore, it was within the power of Coronet to waive its right to
receive such formal statement. In this case, the conduct of Coronet
created in the plaintiffs a reasonable belief that it was not necessary for
them strictly to comply with the letter of this condition in the policy.
Recital of the above facts and of the steps taken by Coronet shows that
never . . . did Coronet ever bring this provision to the attention of the
plaintiffs or require or request their compliance.
Id. at 634.
214. Hamill v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., - Tenn. App. - , 499 S.W.2d
892 (1972).
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the company, fully aware that the insured is ignorant of the require-
ment, purposely permits the thirty day period to lapse in order to
avoid its liability. The oath requirement, therefore, should be retained,
but the insurer should have the burden of securing the statement.
In this manner, fraudulent claims may yet be deterred, but the in-
sured will not be punished for his ignorance of the policy
provisions.215
CONCLUSION
Statutory uninsured motorist coverage has been enacted in all
fifty states in an effort to fill the void left by the motorist who has
not purchased automobile liability insurance. The history of these
remedial statutes, however, has been marked by an ongoing strug-
gle. On the one hand, insurance companies have narrowly inter-
preted the meaning of the statutes and have consequently circulated
policy endorsements containing contractual restrictions on UM
coverage. Conversely, when called upon to interpret the uninsured
motorist statutes, courts have generally construed the acts broadly
so as to afford as much protection as possible to the insured.
In the center of this controversy between the policy limitations
of the insurance companies and the judicial expansion of the
statutes, are the policyholders. Just as the insureds are the
beneficiaries of the protection of the UM statutes, they have in
some ways become victimized by the statutes. The plethora of
judicial decrees examining both the statutes and the various policy
limitations has been of little practical benefit in remedying the con-
troversy. Even though a given policy restriction may have been
judicially voided, the insured may find that his UM endorsement
still contains the restriction. While the weight of legal authority
may be on the side of the insured, as a practical matter all the
policyholder knows is that his policy plainly excludes coverage. In
most instances, the insured will be neither an attorney nor an ex-
pert in insurance coverages. Nevertheless, the insured should be en-
titled to rely on what his insurance contract says without having to
incur the additional time and expense to learn that his insurance
company is selling policies containing invalid provisions. Action by
the courts has clearly not alleviated the confusion.
The insurance companies, similarly, have not benefitted from
the judicial decisions. In many instances the judicial system has ig-
nored the rights of the insurer to control his risks and to limit the
215. See Proposed Regulation No. 8 in Appendix, infra, page 340-41.
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scope of coverage commensurate with the premiums collected. In-
stead, the courts have generally infringed upon the business rights
of the insurer by rationalizing and justifying their decisions on
"public policy" grounds.
All of this is not to imply, however, that the work of the
judiciary has been for naught. The courts have provided a sound
forum for setting forth arguments, theories, and guidelines for unin-
sured motorist coverage. Nor is the judiciary to be chastised greatly
for its efforts. The courts alone have taken the initiative, if not by
choice then by necessity, to explain and interpret the UM statutes
and the policy coverages they require.
The time has long since arrived for the state departments of in-
surance to engage in much of the work heretofore taken up by the
courts. Not only are the insurance departments statutorily charged
with the responsibility to regulate the insurance industry and to
protect the policyholders, but they are also in the position to
analyze and investigate the problems of UM coverage on a much
broader scale than the courts. The problems of the uninsured
motorist and the UM coverage itself require a delicate balancing of
the interests of both the insurer and the policyholder. The regula-
tions proposed in this note are reflective of an attempt to balance
these competing interests. The first step, unsure as it may be, must
be taken toward reform of the uninsured motorist protection.
Donald Paul Seberger
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED REGULATIONS GOVERNING UNINSURED MOTORIST
ENDORSEMENTS
Section One. AUTHORITY. These rules and regulations governing
the policy provisions used in various uninsured motorist en-
dorsements circulated within the State of Indiana are promulgated
by authority of and pursuant to the Indiana Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, IND. CODE § 4-22-2-1 et seq. (1976), and the Indiana In-
surance Law, IND. CODE § 27-1-1-1 et seq. (1976).
Section Two. PURPOSE. The purpose of these rules and regula-
tions is to assure that uninsured motorist endorsements circulated
within the State of Indiana are drafted and enforced in such a manner
as to enhance, strengthen, and clarify the protection afforded by the
Indiana Uninsured Motorists Act, IND. CODE § 27-7-5-1 (1976). Fur-
ther, their purpose is to prevent the circulation of uninsured
motorist policy forms in Indiana which contain ambiguous,
misleading, or inconsistent language or which deceptively affect the
risk purported to be assumed in the insurance contract.
Section Three. PROPOSED REGULATIONS.
Proposed Regulation No. 1.
All uninsured motorist (UM) coverage circulated within
the State of Indiana shall delete all language which ex-
cludes from the definition of "insured," (1) any person
named in the policy, (2) any spouse or relative of the named
insured while residing in the same household, (3) any occu-
pant of an automobile insured in the policy of insurance,
or (4) any person using an insured automobile with the
permission of the insured.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
shall delete all language which excludes from the defini-
tion of "insured" any person named in the policy of in-
surance or the spouse or relative of the named insured
while residing in the same household, while occupying or
driving a non-owned motor vehicle.
Proposed Regulation No. 2.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
which contains a policy exclusion for "owned but unin-
sured" motor vehicles shall be valid and enforceable.
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Proposed Regulation No. 3.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
which contains either or both (1) an "excess-escape" clause
and, (2) a "pro-rata" clause, clearly and unambiguously
stated, shall be valid and enforceable.
Proposed Regulation No. 4.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
shall delete all language which reduces the benefits
payable thereunder by the amount paid or payable under
the medical payments coverage of the automobile in-
surance policy where the actual damages incurred exceed
the policy limits of the applicable UM coverage.
Proposed Regulation No. 5.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
shall delete all language which reduces the benefits
payable thereunder by the amount paid or payable under
workmen's compensation legislation where the actual
damages incurred exceed the policy limits of the ap-
plicable UM coverage.
Proposed Regulation No. 6.
All UM coverage circulated within the State of Indiana
shall delete all language which restricts hit-and-run
coverage to those cases which result from actual physical
contact with the hit-and-run vehicle.
Proposed Regulation No. 7.
All language contained in UM coverage circulated within
the State of Indiana which requires the insured to report
a hit-and-run accident to the police, local magistrate, or
the Department of Motor Vehicles within twenty-four
hours after the occurrence of the accident shall be amended
to read "within twenty-four hours after the occurrence of
the accident or as soon thereafter as practicable under the
circumstances."
Proposed Regulation No. 8.
All language contained in UM coverage circulated within
the State of Indiana which requires the insured to file
with the insurer within 30 days after the accident a state-
ment under oath shall be amended to read "and at the re-
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quest of the insurer shall file a statement under oath
within 30 days after the request for the same is made."
Section Four. ENFORCEMENT. Upon due notice and opportunity to
be heard, an insurer engaged in the business of automobile liability
insurance which causes to be circulated any UM coverage within the
State of Indiana that fails to comply with these rules and regula-
tions, shall be subject to the power of the Commissioner of In-
surance to withhold, withdraw, or revoke such insurer's license to
engage in the business of automobile liability insurance in the State
of Indiana.
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